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Federal Pre-emption of State Laws: The Effect of
Regulatory Agency Attitudes on Judicial
Decisionmaking
Judicial determinations that federal statutes have pre-empted other-
wise valid state laws' raise issues of great practical interest to parties
subject to both federal and state regulation. Such determinations also
present theoretical issues relating to the separation of powers between
the national and state governments. The focus of this note is the
impact of federal regulatory agency2 rules and policies on the judicially
established standards of pre-emption. This note contends that courts,
when deciding whether a state law is pre-empted, have increasingly
deferred to the position taken by the federal agency most directly in-
volved, where Congress has delegated broad regulatory powers to an
agency without expressly addressing the pre-emption issue. To test this
hypothesis this note will first sketch the pre-emption doctrine as articu-
lated by the courts. Secondly, it will review some of the literature on
the theoretical and practical aspects of the pre-emption doctrine. Finally,
this note will test the hypothesis that courts have deferred to federal
agencies on pre-emption. questions by focusing on four recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court and federal appellate courts.
THE SUPREME COURT'S ARTICULATED STANDARDS
Pre-emption problems arise when a state law, legitimately enacted
under the state's general police or welfare power, is challenged as
having been "pre-empted" by federal law operating on the same sub-
ject matter. If there is a direct conflict between state and federal law,
the federal must prevail. Federal law is the supreme law of the land,
state law to the contrary notwithstanding.' On the other hand, it is
equally clear that while states cannot legislate in areas of exclusive
federal jurisdiction, they may pass laws in areas of concurrent power
'The scope of this note is limited to the resolution of apparent statutory conflicts
between federal and state laws.
2The term "regulatory agency" refers to any federal government agency, including
an executive department, which has either the quasi-legislative power to make and en-
force rules, or the quasi-judicial power to adjudicate disputes. Cf. the Administrative
Procedure Act's definition of "agency," 15 U.S.C. § 551(1) (1970).
'U.S. CONST. art. VI, para. 2; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316
(1819). Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), sets out the broad areas of
dominant authority of the federal government under the commerce clause, and the cor-
responding limits on state regulatory powers.
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where Congress has the power to displace them but has not yet done
so.* The question is what standards the courts should apply in deter-
mining the validity of state law, when Congress has acted in the same
general area as the state, and when it is not impossible to enforce both
sets of laws. Is the state law invalidated by implication because of
the congressional legislation, and if not, does the federal law affect the
state law at all? This is the problem of pre-emption.
There is no question that the federal courts must act to prevent
the purposes of Congress from being frustrated by state activity." A
frequently used standard of pre-emption is that of Mr. Justice Douglas
in Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.:
It is clear that since warehouses engaged in the storage of
grain for interstate or foreign commerce are in the federal domain
... . Congress may, if it chooses, take unto itself all regulatory
authority over them . . . , share the task with the States, or
adopt as federal policy the state scheme of regulation. . . . The
question in each case is what the purpose of Congress was.
Congress legislated here in a field which the States have
traditionally occupied. . . . So we start with the assumption
that the historic police powers of the States were not to be super-
seded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress. . . . Such a purpose may be evidenced in
several ways. The scheme of federal regulation may be so per-
vasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no
room for the states to supplement it. . . . Or the Act of Con-
gress may touch a field in which the federal interest is so dominant
that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement
of state laws on the same subject. . . . Likewise, tlae object sought
to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obliga-
tions imposed by it may reveal the same purpose. . . . Or the
state policy may produce a result inconsistent with the objective
of the federal statute. . . . It is often a perplexing question
whether Congress has precluded state action or by the choice of
selective regulatory njeasures has left the police power of the
'Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829). "The ex-
ercise of federal supremacy is not lightly to be presumed." Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S.
199, 203 (1952).
5 Note, Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of Construction, 12
STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground].
Some workable solution must be found, however, since-as opposed to
Congress-the courts cannot constitutionally neglect the pre-emption problem.
Article VI, section 2 requires that the judiciary maintain the supremacy of fed-
eral law, "the laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding." When faced
with the issue, a court must decide the constitutional question whether it is neces-
sary to invalidate a given state law to preserve federal supreacy . . .
Id. at 209-10 (footnote omitted).
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States undisturbed except as the state and federal regulations
collide."
It has been suggested that these standards are unduly vague, gen-
eral, and conclusory7 and lack analytical standards for determining
conflict.' The Rice standards also require a correct interpretation of
legislative intent, often an impossible task.' Legislative saving clauses
framed in the language of the Court-that pre-emption is not lightly
to be inferred-are rarely helpful.'0 Some critics have gone so far
as to suggest that the Court decides pre-emption cases with more at-
tention to ad hoc policy considerations than to the intent of Congress."
An alternate theory is that pre-emption has served as a "preferred
ground" for decisions that might have been as easily reached on other
substantive constitutional grounds. 2
6 331 U.S. 218, 229-31 (1947) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
7 E.g., in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941), Mr. Justice Black commented:
There is not-and from the very nature of the problem there cannot be-any
rigid formula or rule which can be used as a universal pattern to determine the
meaning and purpose of every act of Congress. This Court, in considering the
validity of state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same
subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; contrary to;
occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilability; inconsistency; vio-
lation; curtailment; and interference. But none of these expressions provides
an infallible constitutional test or an exclusive constitutional yardstick.
Id. at 67 (footnote omitted).8 E.g., Freeman, Dynamic Federalism and the Concept of Preemption, 21 DEPAU. L.
REV. 630 (1972) ; Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F.
515, 552-56.
9 Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground, supra note 5, notes:
By framing the pre-emption question in terms of specific congressional in-
tent the Supreme Court has manufactured difficulties for itself. Apart from the
difficult problem of defining which Congress' and which congressman's intent
is relevant, this manner of stating the issue suggests that the pre-emption ques-
tion was consciously resolved and that only diligent effort is needed to reveal
the intended solution. But Congress, embroiled in controversy over policy issues,
rarely anticipates the possible ramifications of its acts upon state law. Like the
conflict of laws questions which are inherent in state statutes but seldom articu-
lated, pre-emption questions are implicit in many federal statutes but remain for
the courts to answer.
Id. at 209 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). See also Petro, Federal Preemption-
A Comment, 33 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 691 (1958); Wham & Merrill, Federal Pre-emption: How
to Protect the States' Jurisdiction, 43 A.B.A.J. 131, 133-34 (1957).
10 See Wham & Merrill, supra note 9; Hirsch, supra note 8, at 538-41. See also note
4 supra.
11 See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 8, at 521-22; Powell, Supreme Court Decisions on the
Commerce Clause and State Police Power, 191o-i914 II, 22 CoLum. L. REv. 28, 48-49
(1922).
12 Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground, supra note 5. The note lists possible alter-
nate grounds for decision in Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (national exclu-
siveness on alien registration) ; Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (national
exclusiveness on sedition; on double jeopardy grounds) ; Castle v. Hayes Freight Lines,
Inc., 348 U.S. 61 (1954) (state regulation of interstate commerce) ; Public Util. Comm'n
v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958) (immunity of the national government from state
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The Practical Impact of Pre-emption Standards
Regardless of the actual motivation for Supreme Court decisions
based on pre-emption, there can be no-doubt about the practical impor-
tance of the pre-emption doctrine in nearly all areas of law. A simple
listing of the broad areas where state laws have been challenged or
overturned as pre-empted by federal law-labor law," antitrust law,,"
agricultural marketing, 5 auto safety,"" government procurement, 7 state
taxation,' pollution standards, 9 and patents'--should impress upon
the practitioner the potential impact of pre-emption on any area of
activity subject to both state and federal regulation. It should also
warn the legislative draftsman, whether he works in Washington or in
a state capital, of one area of potential difficulty." Given the expan-
sion of state regulatory law,22 it is important to understand pre-emption
as it relates to those subject to conflicting rules emanating from national
and state sources.23
regulation). For a discussion of pre-emption and double jeopardy, see Grant, The Scope
and Nature of Concurrent Power, 34 Coums. L. Ruv. 995 (1934).
'3 See, e.g., Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274
(1971); Guss v. Utah Labor Rel. Bd., 353 U.S. 1 (1957); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New
York State Labor Rel. Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947). See generally Cox, Federalism in the
Law of Labor Relations, 67 HAv. L. REv. 1297 (1954); Comrent, Federal Preemption
in Labor Relations, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 128 (1968).
"' For an excellent survey of this complex area of pre-emption law, see J. FLYNN,
FEDERALISM AND STATE ANTITRUST REGULATION 138-200 (1964).
15 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) ; Campbell
v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961); Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
16 See, e.g., Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany, 419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969) ; see text accom-
panying notes 65-78 infra.
17 See, e.g., United States v. Georgia Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 371 U.S. 285 (1963) ; Pub-
lic Util. Comm'n v. United States, 355 U.S. 534 (1958).
'
8 See, e.g., United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964); Urited States v. County of
Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
'9See, e.g., City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960) ; Northern States
Power Co. v. Minnesota, 447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035
(1972). See also text accompanying notes 36-67 infra.
2
0 See, e.g., Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 456 (1973); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v.
Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964).
"1See Wham & Merrill, supra note 9, at 189-90.
22 Schwarzer, Enforcing Federal Supremacy: Relief Agail.st Federal-State Regula-
tory Conflicts, 43 CALIF. L. R v. 234 (1955). In dealing with a typical case, United Air
Lines v. Public Util. Comm'n, 109 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Cal. 1952), rev'd per curiam, 346
U.S. 402 (1953), Schwarzer noted:
United's problem was one that has become increasingly common with the
steady expansion of administrative regulation by the states Federal regulation
having been extended to its constitutional limits in many fields, the system of
federalism is now being put to the test with unprecedentel frequency as state
regulatory power is being pushed to its constitutional limitt.
Id. at 234 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
23 The proper remedy to federal-state regulatory conflicts is sought from a three-
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Problems of Public Policy
Despite agreement in the literature with regard to pre-emption's
importance and the difficulty of interpreting the Supreme Court's
articulated standards, there is relatively little agreement on the proper
standard for pre-emption. This uncertainty reflects the lack of unanim-
ity over the constitutional sources of the doctrine. The conventional
view holds that the power of pre-emption is based on the supremacy
clause.2 Therefore, the pre-emption question is one of legislative and
statutory intent, for which a clearer standard of judicial analysis is
needed. 5
On the other hand, some commentators have challenged the su-
premacy theory. For these commentators, the source is not the su-
premacy clause, which only voids state law when there is a clear con-
flict.26 Rather, the source of pre-emption lies in the nature of con-
judge district court. Schwarzer, supra note 22, at 235 & n.5. The test for injunctive and
declaratory relief is set out in Public Serv. Commr'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952),
and is summarized by Schwarzer as (1) plaintiff must show risk of suffering or penalty,
(2) that declaratory relief will not be used to pre-empt or prejudge issues that are com-
mitted for initial decision to an administrative agency of the state, (3) declaratory relief
that would interfere with the right of state administrators to formulate policy would not
be allowed, because it is contrary to the proper federal policy of cooperation with the
states. Schwarzer, supra note 22, at 236.
24 U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, para. 2. This view is taken by many commentators. See, e.g.,
Hirsch, supra note 8, at 515; Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground, supra note 5, at 209.
25 See, e.g., Hirsch, supra note 8, at 552-56. However, discovering congressional in-
tent is no easy task.
In the great majority of cases the pre-emptive implications of the federal
statute must be derived without the aid of specific legislative guidance, and even
when such guidance is offered, it does not represent the whole solution in many
instances. Thus several writers have suggested that the proper approach is to
determine whether the continued existence of the state law is consistent with the
general purpose of the federal statute by seeking to define the evil Congress
sought to remedy and the method chosen to effectuate its cure. And, to under-
stand the evil and the remedy the court should look to the entire text of the
statute, to its history, and to administrative interpretations, when available.
Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground, supra note 5, at 210 (footnotes omitted). See
generally Dickerson, Statutory Interpretation: A Peek into the Mind and Will of a
Legislature, 50 IND. L.J. 206 (1975)..
This often leads to the result that, "[Q]uestions of state power after congressional
action usually depend for their answer upon the construction of the federal statute ...
While this issue is referred to the intention of Congress, it is apparent that as a rule
it is the court that is doing the intending." Powell, supra note 11, at 48.
26 Freeman, supra note 8, claims that:
The most common misconception found in the cases and the literature is
that the doctrine of preemption must hinge on the supremacy clause. Hamilton
himself seemed to suggest this as a basis in number thirty-three of The Federal-
ist.
Hamilton's assertion must be read in light of his earlier statement that
"the laws of the Confederacy as to the enumerated and legitimate objects of
its jurisdiction will become the SUPREME LAW of the land. . . ." A law
enacted by Congress pursuant to one of its enumerated powers "could not legally
[Vol. 50:848
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current state-federal power. In this concurrent power theory, the issue
is more broadly stated: pre-emption occurs only when the area is such
that it cannot be adequately regulated by the states." It is said that
the supremacy clause theory, by framing the question in terms of con-
gressional intent, so weights the scales in favor of national uniformity
that the states may be deprived of powers that are reserved to them."
And, while the supremacy theory stresses national uniformity and
clarity of standards,29 the concurrent power theory stresses decentraliza-
tion and the advantages of a federal system."
The concurrent power theory, however, poses its own problems.
First of all, it is as yet unclear how to balance federal and state interests
while giving proper deference to federal policies in cases where direct
conflict cannot be found. Secondly, proponents of the concurrent power
be opposed or controlled." This is the approach taken by some of the more
recent supremacy clause cases that can be read as establishing an incompatibility
doctrine.
However, Hamilton made it clear that the federal powers, although to be
supreme when exercised, were intended to exist concurrently with the states in
many, if not all, of the enumerated areas.
Id. at 634-35 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original). See also, Comment, A Con-
ceptual Refinement of the Doctrine of Federal Preemption, 22 J. PuB. L. 391 (1973).2 7 There is a recognized doctrine of dynamic federalism which may be sum-
marized as follows: Although the Constitution confers powers on the national
government, reserves powers to the states, and to some degree restricts both,
such power definition is not the sole source for determining the proper federal-
state relation at any given time. There are some problems which are of such a
nature and dimension that they cannot adequately be handled by the states.
These should be dealt with by the national government and by it only, state ac-
tion being "preempted." It is believed that it is in this are-. that the doctrine of
preemption must and will be developed.
Id. at 637 (footnotes omitted). Cf. Kurland, The Supreme Court and the Attrition of
State Power, 10 STAN. L. REv. 274, 285 (1958).28 It is submitted that the Supreme Court abdicates its duty as arbiter of the
federal system when it makes the test of preemption the intent of Congress,
and no construction should be given to the necessary and proper clause which
would diminish even further the Court's function in allocating power in the fed-
eral system. First, it is questionable whether the action o'Congress should be
allowed to conclusively preclude state action in any given area, unless that pre-
clusion is justified in terms of modem federalism. It is equally doubtful whether
Congress should have the sole power to decide to preclude or not preclude. The
framers intended the Supreme Court, not the Congress, to determine where the
demands of federalism should require the line to be drawn.
Freeman, supra note 8, at 638.
29 See, e.g., Schwarzer, supra note 22.
30 If the states are to reassume their part in the maintenance of that balance of
power which the Constitution seems to have contemplated, they must undertake
a responsibility which they have heretofore shunned, and, in doing so, they must
receive the support of the Supreme Court among whose dtties is the defense of
"the states from the exaggerated claims of the Union."
Kurland, supra note 27, at 283-84 (footnotes omitted). See also Comment, Air Pollution,
Pre-emption, Local Problems and the Constitution-Some Pigeonholes and Hatracks, 10
Amiz. L. REV. 97 (1968).
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theory claim that it provides a necessary restraint on the pre-emptive
power of Congress, there being no other limits on the commerce power.
8
'
This need not be the case. Some have claimed that limits to congres-
sional power remain, and that these, not the pre-emption doctrine, are
the proper means of protecting the reserve powers of the states."2
RECENT DECISIONS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND A "NEw" APPROACH
The purpose of this note is to gauge the effects of the intrusion
of federal regulatory agency rules, standards, and attitudes into the
already existing tangle of congressional intent, state legislation, and
doctrinal theory. The notion that the federal courts should take notice
of administrative policies is hardly a new idea. Professor Hirsch has
asserted a "one master" theory of pre-emption:
Since the Court purports to be seeking and applying con-
gressional intent in these cases, it appears to use the theory as
a means of determining congressional intent. But this intent is a
legal fiction; the theory itself is the real ground of decision.
When Congress delegates broad regulatory power to a federal
agency without addressing itself to the question of preemption
in any detail, the Court infers that the agency will make all of the
regulations which it deems to be required in the field. As a
corollary of this principle, the Court generally infers that supple-
mentary state regulations are to be preempted either because of
an inference that the federal agency's failure to establish similar
regulations represents an agency judgment that they are not
There is today little left for Supreme Court decision so far as the extent of
congressional power is concerned. Though Professor Schwartz deplores the re-
sult, apparently because the Court has gone beyond even the Marshall concep-
tion of federal power, he depicts it accurately when he says: "there are really
no limitations other than Congressional self-restraint upon the federal com-
merce power.' He does not, of course, mean that action taken under the com-
merce power is not subject to the other limitations on federal authority con-
tained in the Constitution. He means simply that by reason of opinions such
as Wickard v. Filburn [317 U.S. 111 (1942)], Congress is now free to read any
economic activity as coming directly within the definition of interstate commerce
or as affecting commerce so that it may be subjected to federal regulation. In
short, the Court has read out of the commerce clause the qualifying phrase:
"with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian
Tribes . . . ." Or it may be that the interdependence resulting from the
advances of technology, rather than the Court, has made the qualifying phrase
obsolete.
Kurland, supra note 27, at 285-86 (footnotes omitted).
82 See, e.g., Engdahl, Preemptive Capability of Federal Power, 45 U. CoLO. L. REv.
51 (1973), which stresses the "necessary and proper" clause as the real limit to pre-
emptive power. Comment, mipra note 30, suggests that the due process clause or the
ninth amendment might be used to combat uniform standards that threaten vital local
needs (e.g., thermal inversions due to overly permissive national auto emission standards).
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needed or because of the operation of other presumptive con-
siderations such as the need for national uniformity.3
If it is true that a broad grant of authority does raise a negative
presumption with regard to state regulation, it would seem logical that
the agency's own stated position"4 would influence the court. Although
this has not been the uniform practice in the past, 5 the cases explored
in this note suggest that courts have relied increasingly on agency policies
toward pre-emption when the intent of Congress is not clear. This
reliance may take two forms: (1) no finding of pre-emption when
there is a history of state-federal cooperation or when there is ac-
quiescence by the agency to state regulation, or (2) a finding of pre-
emption when the stated policy of the agency is hostile to state regula-
tion.
The Social Security Agency and Welfcare Law
The most recent Supreme Court decision to support this hypo-
thesis is New York Department of Social Services v. Dublino.8 The
pre-emption issue was whether the eligibility requirements of the Work
Incentive Program (WIN) of the Social Security Act's Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC) provisions" nullified state at-
tempts to put additional restrictions on eligibility. 8 Mr. Justice
Powell's opinion placed great emphasis on determining the intent of
Congress and found that the legislative policies favored state supple-
mentation. Congress' goal of promoting adequate job training could
not be achieved through the WIN program alone, so state supplemental
programs had been anticipated by Congress and were essential to pro-
83 Hirsch, supra note 8, at 549-50 (footnote omitted).
34Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground, supra note 5, at 216-17, suggests that
agency views may be manifested in any of the following ways: (1) filing of an amicus
brief in the proper court, (2) by the attitudes demonstrated by its formal regulations,
or (3) by a history of cooperation between state and federal authorities. But sketchy
case law indicates the need for more time to allow the case law to develop. E.g., Note,
"Occupation of the Field" in Commerce Clause Cases, 1936-I946: Ten Years of Federal-
ism, 60 Hav. L. REv. 262 (1946), which found that the attorney general appeared only
seven times in the period studied.
85 Hirsch analyzes the exceptions, particularly Florida Lirae & Avocado Growers,
Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 143 (1963) ("not a subject by its very nature admitting only
of national supervision"), Hirsch, supra note 8, at 550-51; Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Pat-
terson, 315 U.S. 148 (1952) (which struck down a state program despite a history of
federal-state cooperation), Hirsch at 551-52. See also, Comment, The Impact of Pre-
emption on Federal-State Cooperation, 1967 U. ILL. L.F. 656.
86413 U.S. 405 (1973).
8742 U.S.C. §§ 602(a) (19), 630-44 (Supp. III, 1973).8s NFw YoRx Soc. SRv. LAW § 131 (McKinney Supp. 1973), required biweekly certi-
fication from local employment office that there was no work available.
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moting federal aims.39  The Court viewed WIN as a cooperative
federal-state attack on unemployment."
However, the cooperative nature of the program did not resolve
the question whether the states could set down standards of eligibility
in a joint federal-state program. A previous line of cases had established
that state law could not exclude from AFDC benefits persons the Social
Security Act expressly held eligible.4 The Court distinguished Dublino
from this line of cases on the grounds that the Department of Health
Education and Welfare (HEW) had approved the New York State
program and had never considered the WIN program to be pre-
emptive.42  "In interpreting this statute, we must be mindful that 'the
construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong
"43
The Court also noted that New York had always applied its work
rules so as to avoid friction and overlap with WIN. For instance, a
person eligible for WIN was referred to HEW first, and only if there
was not any room in WIN was he admitted to the state program.'
The Court concluded its analysis with the statement: "Where coor-
dinate state and federal efforts exist within a complementary admini-
strative framework, and in the pursuit of common purposes, the case
for federal pre-emption becomes a less persuasive one."4 5
Therefore, Dublino must mean that the approval of the agency
involved may allow states to set down restrictions on cooperative pro-
grams, where without such approval the restrictions might be pro-
hibited." Agency approval of the state policy seemed controlling in
89 413 U.S. at 418-22.
40 Id. at 421.
41 Carlson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972); Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282
(1971); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). See New York State Dep't of Social
Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 424-25 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting). For a for-
mulation of the King-Townsend-Carlson standard and the effect of Dublino on that
standard, see Note, AFDC Eligibility Conditions Unrelated to Need: The Impact of
Dublino, 49 1ND. LJ. 334 (1973).
42413 U.S. at 420-22.
43Id. at 421, citing Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969), and
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1970). This shows that deference to ad-
ministrative agency interpretation of statutes is to be applied to pre-emption cases as
well. After taking note of the history of cooperation between New York and federal
officials, the Court found such compelling indications of error in agency interpretation
of the statute "wholly absent." 413 U.S. at 421.
44 413 U.S. at 421.
45 Id.
46See Hirsch, .upra note 8, at 551-52, urging courts to hold such cooperation a block
to pre-emption; Comment, The Impact of Pre-emption on Fedetal-State Cooperation,




The FAA and Noise Pollution
In City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 8 the Supreme
Court, after an extended argument based on legislative intent, granted
the FAA exclusive jurisdiction to regulate aircraft noise pollution.
The City of Burbank, California, had passed an ordinance"9 making it
unlawful for jet aircraft to take off between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m. The
district court found the ordinance unconstitutional on both commerce
clause and pre-emption grounds.0 The court of appeals affirmed, hold-
ing that the ordinance conflicted with FAA preference orders to the
Hollywood-Burbank Airport.5 The Supreme Court held only that the
local ordinance was invalid on pre-emption grounds, and did not reach
the commerce clause issue.52 There was intensive exploration of con-
gressional intent53 through an examination of the Noise Control Act
of 1972"' as it affected the Federal Aviation Act of 1958."5 The an-
alysis included a listing of the broad powers granted to the EPA and
FAA under the 1972 Act." The Court concluded that this broad grant
of power pre-empted state law, a conclusion in keeping with the Hirsch
"one master" theory." An inquiry was also made into the hearings on
the bill, which indicated to the Court that state law was pre-empted."'
The inquiry into the hearings particularly centered on a letter from
47See also Pre-emption as a Preferential Ground, supra note 5. If pre-emption--is a
preferred ground for substantive constitutional doctrine, such ,ubstantive grounds were
clearly absent in Dublino. The district court rejected the welfare recipients' constitu-
tional arguments out of hand, 348 F. Supp. 297 (1972), and the state had complied with
the order to inform recipients of their rights, 413 U.S. at 412 & n.11. The Court had
already upheld state standards in general in Jefferson v. Hackn,.y, 406 U.S. 535 (1972) ;
Richardson v. Belcher, 404 U.S. 56 (1971); and Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471(1970). There were no hard issues in Dublino to make pre-emption a preferred ground.
48411 U.S. 624 (1973).
49 BtMRANK, CAL., MUN. CODE §§ 20-32.1 (1970); 411 U.S. at 626 n.1.
50 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
51457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972).
52411 U.S. at 626 n.2. Once again, the "preferred grounds" issue exists, as there
are other substantive constitutional issues. See note 47 supra. Since there were com-
inerce clause grounds, the Court may have turned to pre-empticn to prevent the decision
from prohibiting localities as airport proprietors from making regulations. The decision
did not affect these powers. 411 U.S. at 635 & rL14. Ironically, Hollywood-Burbank is
the only major airport in the country not owned and operated by a local governmental
unit. 22 KAN. L. REv. 319, 321 (1974).
53411 U.S. at 628-39.
5'42 U.S.C. § 4906 (Supp. III, 1973), and corresponding regulations, 14 C.F.R. 71,
73, 75, 91, 93, 95, 97 (1975).
5549 U.S.C. §§ 1301-55, 1505 (1970).
"' 411 U.S. at 628-33.
57See note 33 supra & text accompanying.
58411 U.S. at 634-38.
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the Secretary of Transportation to the Senate committee in which the
Secretary claimed that federal law already pre-empted state law on
aircraft noise, and that the proposed legislation did not change the
FAA's authority." The majority may have found the Secretary's posi-
tion decisive despite the contrary position of the Solicitor General"0
and the well-reasoned dissent by Mr. Justice Rehnquist." Both pro-
duced much legislative evidence that pre-emption had not been the intent
of Congress.
Beyond the "intent of Congress," the Court considered the position
of the FAA, which had consistently opposed local curfews because of
the FAA's interest in complete management of navigable airspace. 2
This position in favor of pre-emption, adopted by the federal agency
most directly involved, also gave force to the majority's conclusion. 8
Thus Lockheed serves as an example of agency hostility influencing the
Court to overturn a state law.
The conclusion that the Lockheed Court determined congressional
intent by reference to the attitude of the agency most directly involved
is buttressed by the Court's distinguishing Lockheed from Huron Port-
land Cement Co. v. Detroit.8" It is also consistent with the Court's
recent decision in Askew v. American Waterways, Inc.5 In Huron and
Askew, both pre-emption cases under federal maritime jurisdiction, there
was no equivalent to a federal regulatory agency operating in the field.
59 Id. at 635 & n.14. The Court adopted the view expressed in that letter-that states
and municipalities could not control aircraft flights, except as proprietors of airports.
See Berger, Nobody Loves an Airport, 43 S. CAL. L. Rav. 631, 705-25 (1970), for a
summary of pre-Lockheed cases, which support this position taken by the Secretary.
80 411 U.S. at 627-28.
a' Id. at 640-54.
12 Id. at 628. See 15 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 848, 854-55, 858 (1974). See also
Berger, supra note 59, at 723-25, for a critical view of the FAA's role in noise pollution.
63 Comment, State Versus Federal Regulation of Commercial Aeronautics, 39 J.
Am. L. & Com. 521 (1973), views Lockheed as consistent with diminishing local authority
over air carriers, id. at 537, 555, and that Lockheed might also be explained by the Court's
consistent protection of any FAA authority dealing with safety, id. at 537.
Both 22 KAN. L. REv. 319, 334-35 (1974), and 15 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 848,
858-59 (1974) worried about the lack of representation of local interests at the FAA
level; see also Berger, supra note 59, at 703, 724. One commentator states that the
Court's decision may affect localities' ability to use even their proprietary powers, 15 B.C.
IND. & Com. L. REv. 848, 856-57 (1974) and destroy the possibility of local regulation
with FAA approval, id. at 858-59. 22 KAN. L. Rnv., 1319 (1974) suggests that some
property law possibilities exist to aid localities in limiting overflight noise pollution. Id. at
333-34. See Berger, supra note 59, at 636-81.
66362 U.S. 440 (1960) (federal boiler inspection did not exempt ship from local air
pollution law). See American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226
(E.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969).
Cf. Berger, supra note 59, at 706-16.
05411 U.S. 325 (1973). See 28 U. MiAmi L. Rnv. 209 (1973).
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There was no finding of pre-emption in either case. Conflict with an
interested federal agency could not arise, and a finding of pre-emption
would have created a gap between federal and state regulation, with
no federal agency to fill the void.66
The Department of Transportation and Amto Safety
Two important Court of Appeals decisions also support the hypo-
thesis that agency attitudes heavily influence pre-emption decisions.
The first case, Chrysler Corp. v. Tofany,67 is an example of administra-
tive acquiescence in a state regulation that might otherwise have been
pre-empted by the broad grant of power Congress had given the admini-
strative agency. The action by Chrysler was to enjoin the Vermont and
New York Commissioners of Motor Vehicles from banning the sale of
1969 model cars equipped with the "Super-Lite" auxiliary headlight
system. The pre-emption claim was based on the National Traffic and
Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 19668 and Federal Motor Vehicle Safety
Standard No. 108,69 which, it was claimed, gave the Department of
preliminary letter from the Federal Highway Safety Bureau informed
Chrysler that "Super-Lite" apparently was not precluded by Standard
108,70 it was the opinion of the Director that the states might "inter-
pose restrictions."'" New York and Vermont officials, concerned with
glare effects on hilly two-lane roads and the alleged fact that "Super-
Lite" gave off a blue flashing reflection that could be mistaken for
emergency flashers, banned "Super-Lite" from their state highways.7 2
The Second Circuit's opinion began with an evaluation of sec-
tion 1392(d) of the Act, which prohibited state action where (1) there
66 Normally the Court abhors "gaps" between federal and state regulation. E.g.,
Head v. New Mexico Bd. of Examiners, 374 U.S. 424 (1963) (noting lack of FCC
power to police minor infractions). See O'Neil, Television, Tort Law and Federalism, 53
CALiF. L. REV. 421, 457-61 (1965). But cf. Guss v. Utah Labor Rel. Bd., 353 U.S. 1
(1957), which held state labor relations board powerless to act on unfair labor practices
despite NLRB failure to assert jurisdiction. In ignoring the amicus brief of the NLRB,
which would have allowed the state to intervene, the Court created "a no-man's land of
lawless conduct which no government could reach." Hirsch sufra note 8, at 547. See
also Petro, mspra note 9, for a detailed analysis of Guss. The Guss approach has been
followed as to state court jurisdiction in Amalgamated Ass'n of Street Employees v.
Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971), following Guss's companion case, San Diego Bldg.
Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 236 (1957).
67419 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1969).
68 15 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1426 (1970).
6949 C.F.R. § 571.108 (1974).
70 419 F.2d at 503-04.
7.Id. at 504.
72 Id. at 503.
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was a federal standard already covering an item of equipment, (2)
where the state safety standard was not identical with the federal, and
(3) where there were federal and state standards affecting the same
aspect of performance. 8 This portion of the Act ran counter to the
position of the Federal Highway Commissioner that the states could
make additional restrictions if "Super-Lite" did indeed meet federal
standards. However, the court held that the state regulation did not
regulate the same aspect of performance."' To reach the conclusion that
"the same aspect of performance" should be read narrowly, in favor
of state regulation, the court explored the legislative history of the
Act.71 It concluded that reduction of accidents rather than national
uniformity was the goal of Congress."0 This goal would not be met
by pre-emption of state law because (1) the Act did not require pre-
distribution approval of safety factors by the Federal Highway Safety
Bureau, (2) there would be no federal regulation for several months
after distribution due to procedural delays," and (3) there was a
manifest interest of the states in preventing accidents in the interim.7"
Furthermore, the court stressed the desirability of letting the states
regulate to meet their particular local conditions rather than the policy of
uniform national standards suggested by the phrase "same aspect of
performance. '79
In addition to these considerations the court showed some inclina-
tion to allow the agency to control the scope of pre-emption. It noted
that pre-emption would create a gap between federal and state law, while
state regulation would not frustrate a national purpose because pre-
emption could easily be accomplished by amending the agency standards
to eliminate the state law. 0 A further example of deference to agency
control is the court's reliance upon the statement in the amicus brief
of the Federal Highway Safety Bureau that Standard No. 108 was never
intended to be pre-emptive."1 It is doubtful that the court would
have read "the same aspect of performance" so narrowly had the agency







791d. at 509-11. While this meets the standards of those who see the issue of pre-
emption as correct allocation of state-federal power. see note 27 supra, the "gap" issue
and federal regulatory acquiescence are also present.
80 See text accompanying note 66 supra.
81419 F.2d at 511-12.
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be able to delegate authority to a state agency even when there is a
broad grant to the agency to create uniform rules.8 2
The Atomic Energy Commission and Pollution
In Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota,83 the Eighth Circuit
held that Atomic Energy Commission standards for radioactive emis-
sions were exclusive controls and that the state could not set additional
standards pursuant to its own policy. Northern States Power was
engaged in the production, transportation, and sale of electric power
in Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota and Wisconsin and, there-
fore, indisputably in interstate commerce.8 Construction of the plant
was approved by the AEC,85 but when Northern States applied to the
Minnesota Pollution Control Agency for a waste disposal permit, the
permit was issued but subject to certain conditions more stringent than
the federal standards.8 The court, after a summation of the Supreme
Court's articulated pre-emption standards,87 considered the major issue
-whether the states could add more stringent regulations on radio-
active pollution to the federal standards, it not being physically im-
possible to comply with both the federal and state laws." In holding
that the states could not impose additional regulations, the court made
82Note however the caustic "concurrence" of Judge Friendly, which stated:
My 1most important objection is to the basic assumption that the preemption
clause, § 1392(d), of the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,
15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq., should be narrowly construed. Such an approach seems
to me to fly in the face both of the language of the Act and of the legislative
history. The very existence of an express preemption claus,. is somewhat un-
usual. Moreover, this one was worded in the strongest po3sible terms. The
prohibition is not simply against a state standard in conflict with the federal
standard; Congress prohibited any state standard "applicable to the same aspect
of performance which is not identical to the federal standard ..
It is no answer that the overall objective of the Safety Act was "to reduce
traffic accidents and deaths and injuries to persons resulting from traffic acci-
dents." Congress meant not simply to do this but to do it in -a particular way,
namely, by promoting national standards that would preempt any differing state
ones, whether lower or higher, in order to assure manufacturers that if they met
federal requirements, they could market their cars throughout the Union. Con-
gress knew how much the topography of Vermont differs from that of Kansas
as well as we do. .
What these cases show above all is the need for the National Highway
Safety Bureau to move swiftly to implement Congress' manifest intention and
eliminate the scholastic distinctions and waste of effort whikh litigations such
as these necessarily entail. One can only hope the majority's indication that the
preemption clause is to be narrowly construed will not tempt the Bureau to rely
on the false assumption that the duties Congress entrusted to it can be largely
left with the states.
419 F.2d at 512-13, 515.
83447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
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a rigorous study of the federal statutes in question, particularly 42
U.S.C. § 2021, which permits the AEC to relinquish control over cer-
tain nuclear materials and turn the authority over to the states."' The
AEC was forbidden to relinquish control over "construction and opera-
tion" of a nuclear power plant by section 2021(c), and the court ac-
cepted the AEC view that since discharges were included in "con-
struction and operation"'" the AEC had exclusive control over dis-
charges."'
The legislative history and the joint committee report tended to
support the court's reading of "construction and operation."' 2 How-
ever, even when the court considered legislative history, the opinion of
the AEC was important. "Moreover, the intent of Congress clearly
spelled out in the committee report takes on even more significance in
light of the fact that this expression of pre-emption was consistent with
the intention of the sponsor of the legislation, the AEC.""' Finally, the
court turned to the administrative interpretation of the statute and noted
AEC regulations providing that the states lacked authority to regulate
discharges from nuclear power plants.9 4
841d. at 1144.
85 Id. at 1145.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 1146-47. The circuit court's view was: the power to regulate the area
must be vested in Congress by the Constitution; once it is decided that Congress has
validly legislated, the question is one of determining whether Congress intended to exert
their control in such a manner as to exclude the states; no delving into congressional in-
tent is necessary if compliance with both the state and federal laws is physically impos-
sible; where Congress has expressed an unequivocal intent to displace the state law, there
is no question on the invalidity of the state controls; even where Congress does not ex-
pressly preempt a state law, pre-emption may be implied from (a) the aim of the federal
law, the statute itself, or legislative history, (b) the pervasiveness of the regulatory
scheme, (c) whether the subject regulated requires uniform national control, or (d)
whether the state law stands as an obstacle to the full purposes of Congress. See gen-
erally notes 6-12 supra and text accompanying.
88 See note 87 supra. This is the first time that a court has ever separated the "phy-
sical impossibility" issue, under the supremacy power, from the pre-emption issue, though
the traditional analysis of pre-emption was used.
9 447 F.2d at 1148-49. Section 2021(b) allowed discontinuance of AEC authority
over radiation hazards in quantities not sufficient to form critical mass when the governor
of a state and the AEC had entered an agreement to that effect. However, the court
said this section did not apply to radioactive discharges firom power plants and, in any
event, the governor of the state had not entered into an agreement with the AEC.
90 Id. at 1149 & n.6.
91 The literature also supports this view. See Cavers, State Responsibility in the
Regulation of Atomic Reactors, 50 Ky. L.J. 29, 34 (1961) ; Hehman, Pre-emption: Ap-
proaching Federal-State Conflict over Licensing Nuclear Power Plants, 51 MARQ. L. REV.
43, 67 (1967) ; Neel, Federal or State Jurisdiction over Atomic Products and Waste-
A Dilemma, 50 Ky. L.J. 52, 57 (1961).
92447 F.2d at 1147-54.
931d. at 1152.
94 10 C.F.R. § 8.4 (1975).
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Throughout the opinion the attitude of the AEC that it had ex-
clusive jurisdiction over the regulation of radioa.,tive emissions in-
fluenced the court's interpretation of the statutes and committee hear-
ings.9" Nothing in the statute denied the states the authority to regulate
radioactive pollution. The very hearings so heavily relied on by the
majority were also used by dissenting Judge Van Oosterhout to show
that when this same Minnesota regulatory power was discussed, the
AEC expressed no need for pre-emptive legislation. ' Therefore, where
the statute was unclear on the subject of pre-emption, the majority and
dissent both relied heavily on the position taken by the agency involved.
Northern States, like Lockheed, indicates that agency hostility toward
state legislation may influence a judicial finding of pre-emption.
CONCLUSION
Various decisions of the Supreme Court and the federal appellate
courts in areas such as welfare rights (Dublino), pollution (Lockheed
and Northern States), and highway safety (Tofany), appear to vindi-
cate the initial hypothesis of this note, that the rules, regulations and
attitudes of the federal agency most directly involved may control the
outcome of a pre-emption case. If this is so, the following conclusions
may be drawn: (1) Where there is a federal regulatory agency or
executive department in a field, it is an almost impossible burden to
show that exclusive rulemaking authority does not exist in the agency,
if the agency is opposed to the enforcement of the tate law, as it was
in Lockheed and Northern States; (2) On the other hand, if the state
can show a history of cooperation, as in Dublino, or acquiescence, as in
Tofany, the state regulation may be saved; (3) It is also possible that
where there is no federal regulatory agency with authority over the
area, federal pre-emption will not be lightly presumed, thereby pre-
venting "gaps" between federal and state regulation.
From a practical point of view, deference to the opinion of the
agency on a pre-emption question engenders various policy benefits
and costs. Substituting agency intent for the more elusive intent of
Congress may produce more predictable results. It also protects co-
operative federal-state projects from claims of pre-emption. On the
other hand, it must be asked whether the power to invalidate state
laws should be delegated to the agencies.
95 E.g., 447 F.2d at 1152 n.10: "The hearings before the Joirt Committee reflect that
the AEC consistently maintained that the federal government Lad pre-empted the field
regarding licensing and regulation of nuclear power reactors."
91 447 F.2d at 1155-56.
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From a theoretical point of view, taking notice of agency regula-
tions and rules to determine a pre-emption question may be criticized.
Insofar as the theoretical basis of pre-emption is the supremacy clause,
pre-emption is a power of Congress and not of the agency. Hirsch's
"one master" theory, although it focuses on the scope of authority of
the agency, is nonetheless cast in terms of congressional intent. Recent
decisions show a deference to agency attitudes beyond a concern with
legislative intent. This leaves the agencies free to establish their own
scope of authority vis-a-vis the states.
If pre-emption is framed in terms of the concurrent power theory,
with attention not to the intent of Congress but to a correct division of
power between federal and state authority, simple deference to the agency
position will prove fruitless. The choice between national uniformity
or decentralized decisionmaking cannot hinge on the attitude of a federal
agency whose very existence is premised on promoting national uni-
formity. However, breaking away from a rigid reliance on "congres-
sional intent" may make it possible to judge pre-emption cases through
a balancing of federal and state interests. Framing the issue in terms of
whether the job can be properly handled by the state makes the agency
interest vital. A state might be denied authority in areas such as
atomic energy, pollution, or regulation of air commerce unless it shows
a close partnership with the federal agency most directly concerned.
But the courts must act positively to protect the state's right to act in-
dependently of federal law when the state exerts reserved powers be-
yond the scope of federal authority, or when the state acts in areas of
concurrent jurisdiction which are only partially regulated by congres-
sional action.
MICHAEL G. MCFADDEN
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